The Kalam Argument for the Existence of God

This is a question I received and my response.

QUESTION-

"I wanted to get your opinion on something. I recently watched a clip of Graham Oppy talking about the Kalam Cosmological argument. He says that when you pose God as a solution you are adding a new “substance” or “thing” or assumption to the argument. So since we know the universe exists it’s simpler to say that the universe is the necessary cause. Now the clip I saw was taken from another video so I don’t get the whole context. But basically, how would you respond to someone saying it’s best to assume a unknown naturalistic cause for the universe (even if it’s a universe before ours) verses God creating it?"

RESPONSE-

Josh, I know you said you really don't have the full context of Graham Oppy's comments so it's a little difficult to be sure I'm addressing his point. If his point was that positing God as the cause of the universe is not justified simply because God is not part of the universe...well that is essentially saying it's not justified to say the universe has a cause. But, that's the entire point of the Kalam argument! So I'm not sure that is what he was driving at but if so, it's begging the question. If on the other hand, his point was that by introducing God as a supernatural cause one is introducing a more complex solution thus violating Ockham's razor, then I would say it only violates Ockham's principle if positing a cause within the universe makes sense. I believe we can say no, it does not make sense. For it to make sense we have to posit that the universe is the cause of itself which is patently nonsensical! Again, such a proposal actually runs contrary to the Kalam argument. Premise 2 of the argument states, "the universe began to exist". Thus P2 precludes the idea that the universe itself is necessary or eternal. Rather, unless one can defeat P2 of the argument, the conclusion (C1) follows logically and necessarily. One cannot say P1 is true and P2 is true yet claim the universe is necessary or eternal!  If P1 and P2 are true, the universe is clearly not eternal and therefore must have a cause. The current scientific consensus is that P1 and P2 are true. But what about your explicit question?

You asked, "...how would you respond to someone saying it’s best to assume a unknown naturalistic cause for the universe (even if it’s a universe before ours) verses God creating it?" My first response would be derived from what I explained above, the whole point of the Kalam argument is to present the logical, inescapable conclusion from P1 and P2. You cannot assume an unknown naturalist cause for the universe if you agree to P2 because a naturalistic cause means a cause that is of nature which by definition is within the universe! And, P2 is the scientific consensus so one would need to provide a defeater for that premise. In your question, you introduce a potential defeater which is the multiverse theory. Nevertheless, my first response to someone who objects that a naturalistic cause is best is to say, the universe cannot cause itself. The idea of self-cause is nonsensical.

But what about the "multiverse" theory to which you refer when you say, "even if it's a universe before ours"? There are various permutations of the multiverse idea but suffice it to say none have gained consensus, all are highly speculative, and anything but simple as an alternative to divine causation! To propose a multiverse construct to explain the existence of our universe certainly doesn't qualify as a simpler solution. The *only* thing that it might possibly "buy" the objector over a Divine causation solution is that it could be called "naturalistic". So, if one is operating from a naturalistic presupposition, it will be more appealing. However, the multiverse theories are so speculative I think a case can be made they are more in the realm of metaphysics than in the realm of physics. But, even assuming they are squarely in the realm of physics a multiverse theory really just begs the question. Where did the multiverse come from?! Unless one can demonstrate with more probability than P2 (which enjoys current scientific consensus) that the multiverse is necessary/eternal, then one must also posit a cause to the multiverse. Thus the multiverse fails as an ultimate cause for the universe.

The genius of the Kalam argument (beyond being most aligned to the empirical evidence of course) is that its conclusion is logically inescapable if P1 and P2 are true. P1 is virtually undisputed and P2 enjoys current scientific consensus. Further, the logic leads to additional conclusions that are very difficult to dispute leading to specifically a Divine cause. This of course is why many go to such extreme speculative measures to propose a naturalistic cause. Building upon C1 we can say, (C2) the cause must be outside the universe, i.e. independent from the universe in order to be a cause of the universe, (C3) and if the cause is "prior" to the universe, i.e. no time and space yet existed, the cause must be timeless and spaceless, and (C4) the cause must be immensely powerful, with (C5) immense intelligence to have caused a universe of such amazing fine-tuning to support life, and finally (C6) the cause must be personal to best explain the act of causing "prior" to time itself because that implies a decision and a decision implies a mind. So as we can see, many subsequent conclusions flow from C1 of the Kalam argument. This expands the scope and explanatory power of the argument helping to establish it as a superior or more plausible explanation for the universe than a purely naturalistic explanation.

Josh, I hope this helps. God bless you!